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The Non-Medical Use of 
Prescription Opioids
By: Nicole Russo
Introduction
 The non-medical use of prescription opioids has 
reached an epidemic level in the United States. What began as
a paradigm shift in the medical world to better address the
treatment of pain in the 1990s has turned into an escalating 
public health problem, with highly addictive prescription
opioids becoming more readily and often legally available to
the public than any other illicit drug. According to the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, more than 16.7 
million people in the United States ages 12 and older abused
prescription drugs in the year 2012 (McHugh, Nielsen, & 
Weiss, 2015). Drug overdoses have become the leading cause
of accidental death in the United States. Of the 52,404 known 
people who died of a drug overdose in 2015, 20,101 of these
deaths were caused by prescription pain relievers (Owens & 
Smirnova, 2018). As a result of the opioid epidemic in the
United States, there has been a wealth of academic literature
dedicated to understanding what they are, how they are used,
and some of the factors associated with misuse of prescription
opioid medications such as ease of access, gender, age, the
context of one’s environment, the lower perception of harm 
associated with them, and social stigma attached to their use. 
What Are Opioids?
 Opioids are a class of drugs naturally found in the 
opium poppy plant but they can also consist of man-made 
substances crafted using chemicals with the same structure 
(Brady, McCauley, & Back, 2016). Examples of opioids include 
the illegal drug heroin, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and
prescription pain relievers such as oxycodone (OxyContin), 
hydrocodone (Vicodin), codeine, morphine, and several others
(Becker, Sullivan, Tetrault, Desai, & Fiellin, 2008). Once
ingested, opioids attach to opioid receptors located on nerve
cells in the brain, spinal cord, and other parts of the body. After 
the receptors are blocked by opioids,
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pain messages can no longer be effectively sent throughout the body. While opioids are often able to
relieve pain for those who suffer from injuries or chronic conditions, they carry considerable risks for 
addiction, misuse for nonmedical reasons, and overdose.
Medical vs. Non-Medical Use
As previously explained, there are opioids that can be licitly used with a prescription under the
supervision of a doctor. As a result, the literature distinguishes between medical and non-medical use 
of prescription opioids using a variety of terms to characterize the misuse and abuse of opioids. Medical
use of opioids is defined as use in accordance with a legitimate prescription from a doctor in terms of
dosage, frequency, method of ingestion, and duration of treatment (Brady et al., 2016; Sehgal,
Manchikanti, & Smith, 2012; Cochran et al., 2014). Medical use of opioids is not without its potential 
consequences, however. Even when used as directed by a doctor, any regular use of prescription 
opioids is associated with physical dependence—manifesting as symptoms of withdrawal when use is
abruptly stopped or decreased—and tolerance—occurring when more of the drug is required to achieve 
the same effect. (Brady et al., 2016). However, the literature emphasizes that being physically 
dependent does not necessarily mean that an individual has an opioid use disorder if they are taking 
the medications as prescribed (Brady et al., 2016; Buchman, Leece, & Orkin, 2017).
Non-medical use of opioids is used as an umbrella term in the literature to characterize any use 
of opioids without a prescription or in a way that does not comply with the doctor’s instructions in
their prescription (Brady et al., 2016; Sehgal et al., 2012; Becker et al., 2008; Cochran et al., 2014). Misuse
is another term in the literature used to describe either knowingly or unintentionally using a substance 
in a way inconsistent with legal or medical guidelines, such as sharing medications or altering doses.
Abuse, however, consists of misuse of a medication with more serious consequences such as using a 
substance to modify one’s mood or state of mind in a way that is illegal or harmful to oneself or other 
people. Consequences of abuse include accidents, injury, blackouts, and increased likelihood of unsafe
sexual behaviors, among others (Sehgal et al., 2012). Within this category of nonmedical use of opioids 
is drug diversion, referring to the intentional transfer of a controlled substance that was legally 
prescribed to one person to another person for illicit use (Brady et al., 2016; Cochran et al., 2014; 
McHugh et al., 2015). The concept of drug diversion is particularly relevant for opioids compared to
other illicit drugs, as they are more likely to be obtained from family members, friends, or 
acquaintances (Owens & Smirnova, 2018). 
Aberrant drug-seeking behavior refers to a broad range of behaviors that are inconsistent with a prescribed
plan of care ranging from mildly problematic—stockpiling medications to have extra during more 
severe pain—to illegal actions such as forging prescriptions. However, the literature highlights the 
difficulty in distinguishing between individuals using opioids illicitly and those for whom the 
behaviors are manifested out of uncontrolled pain (Sehgal et al., 2012). In their work, McHugh et al.
(2015) emphasize the resulting unclear boundaries between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” use or 
abuse of opioids, writing that ,“Although motives to feel high and to enhance social experiences are
common, this population also uses these medications to manage symptoms of pain, anxiety, sleep 
disruption, and other conditions that are receiving inadequate
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treatment” (p.6). The status of prescription opioids as drugs that can be necessary for treatment
while simultaneously being abused and used illicitly creates a dilemma that does not exist when
considering other illicit drugs such as heroin.
Factors Associated with Non-Medical Opioid Use 
Ease of Access
The literature universally suggests that the relative ease with which individuals have been 
able to acquire opioids compared to other drugs has contributed to the epidemic of misuse, abuse,
and addiction (McHugh et al., 2015; Brady et al., 2016). According to Brady et al. (2016), doctors were
often criticized for undertreating pain prior to the paradigm shift that occurred in the late 1990s. 
Pain became the “fifth vital sign,” with doctors transitioning to a full-force treatment of pain with 
opioid medications. As a result of the continually growing practice of prescribing opiates, the 
number of opioid prescriptions in 2012 (259 million) was nearly equivalent to the adult population
of the entire United States. Because opioids can be obtained legally and are subsequently present in
many households, it has become much easier to obtain them than other kinds of illicit drugs. In fact,
most adolescents participating in the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported
receiving prescription opioids for free from a friend or relative through drug diversion, misusing 
their own prescriptions, or taking them from friends or family members without asking (McHugh 
et al., 2015). Why pay for or risk trying to obtain illegal drugs when they can steal their friend or 
loved one’s pain medication from the medicine cabinet? 
Gender 
Much of the literature surrounding opioid use determined that there are gender differences
in terms of prevalence, methods, and motives for opioid use (Back, Payne, Simpson, & Brady, 2010;
Back, Lawson, Singleton, & Brady, 2011). In their work, Back et al. (2010) analyzed results from 
55,279 (26,746 men and 28,533 women) non-institutionalized participants of the 2006 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health. The survey collects information on the prevalence and correlates 
of drug use among civilians ages 12 and older. They found that significantly more men than women 
had indicated both lifetime (15.9% vs. 11.2%) and past-year (5.9% vs. 4.2%) non-medical use of 
prescription opioids. Additionally, men were found to be more likely than women to obtain their 
opioids through drug diversion from family and friends or buy them from a dealer as compared to 
obtaining a prescription. This distinction highlights that men may have easier access to these drugs 
in comparison to females which contributes to their higher rates of use. In terms of ingestion 
methods, men were found to be more likely to use opioids with alternative routes such as crushing 
and snorting pills rather than oral consumption. Finally, women were found more likely than men 
to receive prescriptions for opioids in combination with sedatives, which has been identified as a
risk factor for accidental overdose. The combination of opioids and sedatives has been linked to 
women being more likely to use these drugs to cope with physical, sexual, emotional, or mental 
abuse that they experience at greater proportions than men. 
In their qualitative study, Back et al. (2011) conducted in-depth interviews of 24 non-
treatment seeking adults (12 men and 12 women) who had experienced prescription opioid
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dependence in the previous year. Back et al. (2011) found that women were approximately six
years older than men when they initially engaged in prescription opioid use, but only three years
older than men when beginning to use them regularly. From this finding, they suggest that
women experience an accelerated progression of addiction and increased use. Consistent with
Back et al. (2010), they found that men were significantly more likely (75% vs. 16.7%) to crush
and snort prescription opioids. Finally, Back et al. (2011) found that the women participants were 
significantly more likely than men to be motivated by the desire to cope with interpersonal stress 
and consequently use opiates first thing in the morning. 
Age
The majority of the literature suggests that younger adults are at highest risk for non-
medical use and abuse of prescription opioids (Becker et al., 2008; Cochran et al., 2014; Hu, 
Griesler, Wall, & Kandel, 2017; West, Severtson, Green, & Dart, 2015). In their study, Becker et
al. (2008) analyzed the results of 91,823 respondents ages 18 and older from the 2002-2004 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health. Ultimately, they found that younger ages— 
particularly 18-21—were significantly associated with past-year non-medical use of prescription
opioids. Cochran et al. (2014) conducted an investigation using a large commercial insurance
claims database to identify variables that distinguished people who received an opioid abuse or 
dependence diagnosis within two years of filling an opioid prescription compared to those who
did not receive a diagnosis. Compared to those who were not diagnosed, those who had been
diagnosed were on average younger (37.9 years old compared to 47.7). In a larger study, Hu et
al. (2017) collected data from 542,556 individuals ages 12-34 who participated in the 13
consecutive National Surveys on Drug Use and Health between 2002-2014 in order to examine
age-related patterns in nonmedical prescription opioid use and disorder among past-year users. 
In concurrence with Becker et al. (2008), they found that past-year nonmedical prescription 
opioid use increases during adolescence and peaks at ages 18-21 then decreases between ages
30-34. Additionally, Hu et al. (2017) found that use during the ages of 12-34 decreased from the 
1984-1987 birth cohorts to more recently-born cohorts. These findings suggest that the trend of 
opioid use in younger people may be slowing down. As with any survey-based research, these
studies have the limitation of relying on self-reported data that may not reflect completely
accurate proportions of drug use. However, they reveal a great deal of information regarding the 
disproportionate non-medical use of opioids among younger individuals. 
Focusing on older adults, West et al. (2015) examined trends in the misuse and fatal 
outcomes related to prescription opioids among those ages 60 and over and compared them to
trends among younger adults ages 20-59. To do so, they analyzed data from 184,136 cases and 
1,149 deaths associated with misuse of oxycodone, fentanyl, hydrocodone, morphine, 
oxymorphone, hydromorphone, methadone, buprenorphine, tramadol, and tapentadol that
were reported to the U.S. Poison Centers of the Researches, Abuse, Diversion and Addiction 
Related Surveillance (RADARS) System between 2006 and 2013. In concurrence with the other 
literature, they found that rates of abuse of prescription opioids were lower for older adults
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than younger adults. However, they found that mortality rates and suicidal intent among the older
individuals had an increasing linear trend and had exceeded rates for younger adults in
both 2012 and 2013, suggesting a need to direct more efforts towards those who are most often 
prescribed such medication, namely, the elderly. 
Rural vs. Urban Environment
The distinction between living in a rural or urban environment has also been examined by the
literature for its potential impact on opioid use (Keyes, Cerda, Brady, Havens, & Galea, 2014; Havens,
Young, & Havens, 2011). In their study, Havens et. al (2011) used a nationally representative sample of 
17,842 individuals ages 12-17 interviewed about their drug use habits in the 2008 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health to determine whether or not rurality is an independent risk factor. For the
purposes of the study, rural areas were defined as counties having less than 1,000,000 residents and 
that do not reside within a metropolitan statistical area containing 50,000 or more residents. Their
findings indicated that adolescents in rural areas were 26% more likely than their urban counterparts
to indicate non-medical prescription drug use. A significant limitation of this study—as with any based
on such a survey—is its reliance on self-reporting, particularly with a sample of adolescents who could
have been worried about admitting to drug use. 
The literature aims to explain this association between geography and opioid use by examining 
the cultural, structural, and social differences between rural and urban environments. In their work,
Keyes et al. (2014) use empirical bases to hypothesize that four factors can explain the pattern of 
increased nonmedical prescription opioid use in rural areas as compared to urban settings. The first 
factor is the increased sales of opioid analgesics (painkillers) in rural areas compared to urban areas,
leading to greater availability for nonmedical use through diversion. Keyes et al (2014) explain that 
rural populations are on average older than urban populations, resulting in more chronic pain for 
which prescription opioids are used. Further, Keyes et al. (2014) note that prescription drug use is
embedded in the culture of rural areas such as Appalachian Kentucky, where narcotics are frequently
prescribed to maintain workflow in mines and other heavy labor industries (p.54). With more opioids 
available, there is an increase in opportunity for illegal markets. Keyes et al (2014) identified the out­
migration of upwardly mobile young adults from rural areas as the second risk factor. This out­
migration has led to an aging workforce population that may require more opioid prescriptions.
Additionally, this migration has resulted in increased economic deprivation in rural areas, with higher 
rates of unemployment resulting in an aggregation of young adults that are at high risk for drug use.
The third risk factor identified was the tight kinship and social networks typical in the cultural
context of rural areas. Contrary to other illicit drugs often obtained through the illicit drug market, one
of the main sources of prescription opioids for nonmedical use is the diversion of prescriptions
legitimately filled by parents, relatives, friends, or acquaintances (Owens & Smirnova, 2018; Keyes et
al, 2014; Buchman et al., 2017; Brady et al., 2016; McHugh et al., 2015). The close ties within family and
social networks in relatively isolated rural areas ultimately allow for faster diffusion and diversion of 
prescription drugs to nonmedical users. 
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The fourth and final factor tying rural areas to increased opioid use are the structural stressors
of modern rural living (Keyes et al, 2014; Hanes et al, 2011). While there are undoubtedly stressors 
associated with both urban and rural environments, the literature suggests that rural areas have been 
more adversely affected by economic downturns. According to Keyes et al (2014), rural areas in 
particular “have faced job sector and industry shifts as populations shift to meet the labor demands of
changing markets, resulting in long-term economic deprivation, high rates of unemployment, and 
fewer opportunities for establishing a long-term career with…upward mobility” (p.55). Financial
problems and work stressors have been determined to lead to prescription drug abuse as a maladaptive
response to cope with these issues (Hendy, Black, Can, Fleishcut, & Aksen, 2018; Becker et al., 2008). 
While Keyes et. al (2014) identified these factors in their work, they did not test them. Additionally, 
they identified the limitation of not being able to accommodate for how demographic factors such as 
race interact with these four factors they identified. 
Lower Perceptions of Harm
Another factor contributing to the abuse of prescription opioids is the perception that they are
“safer” than using other illicit drugs, either because they are provided by trusted sources such as
doctors, family members, and friends or that they are not as “hardcore” as other drugs (Owens &
Smirnova, 2018; Keyes et al., 2014; McHugh et al., 2015; Fleary, Heffer, & McKyer, 2013; Buchman et 
al., 2017). In their study, Fleary et al. (2013) administered an online anonymous survey to a sample of 
465 students ages 18-24 from a public college in the Southwestern United States. In the survey, students
were asked about their non-prescription and prescription drug use, other substance abuse, and their 
perceived risk and perceived social stigma of nonprescription and prescription drug use as compared 
to that of illicit drugs. In concurrence with their hypothesis, the level of perceived risk was found to be
predictive of misuse. Fleary et al. (2013) also found that perceived risk of nonprescription and 
prescription drugs was lower than for crack or cocaine but higher than marijuana, leading to the
conclusion that adolescents and young adults perceive misuse of prescription and nonprescription 
drugs as a “middle ground between too little and too much risk” (p.4). This determination supports 
the idea that individuals choose to commit or refrain from behaviors at least in part because of the risk
they perceive to be associated with it. 
In their qualitative study, Owens and Smirnova (2018) interviewed 40 incarcerated women about their 
experiences with the prescription drug market and other drug markets in order to understand 
differences in perception between the markets. Based on these interviews, they found that overall, the
women perceived that the prescription market was less dangerous, involved different users and 
dealers, and carried less risk in terms of social disapproval and legal repercussions. A woman named
Rihanna was quoted, “The people that I got the Xanax and stuff from were my friends, they were in a
way, thinking that they were looking out for my best interests” (p.401). In terms of perceptions of legal
harm, Dee-Ann was quoted, “You don’t have as much to lose because if the cops…kick your door in,
you have a prescription for it. What are they going to say? To where if you have a pound of meth sitting 
in the corner you’re really screwed” (p.404). In their review of the history of the opioid epidemic, 
Buchman et al. (2017) also recount this difference in perception. They write, “Drugs used in a medical 
context are considered legitimate and relatively harmless, and unlike ‘street’ drugs, issues of legality
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and social permissibility are less relevant” (p.611). The stark contrast between the perceptions of harm
associated with prescription drugs and other illicit drugs demonstrates that there is less incentive to 
abstain from prescription opioid use compared to more “hardcore” drugs.
Stigma 
While people generally have lower perceptions of harm and risk associated with opioids 
compared to other drugs, opioid use is not without social stigma. In their work recounting the moral
and regulatory history of the opioid epidemic, Buchman et al. (2017) identify two kinds of persons that
have been socially constructed through the process of screening and diagnosis for pain management 
involving opioids: the “deserving pain patient” and the “undeserving addict” (p.614). According to 
Buchman et al. (2017), this classification has been made as a result of a transition from an objective
description of medical issues to a normative process that makes a moral statement about the legitimacy
of a person’s suffering and attaches a negative connotation to their existence. An example provided 
was the “Good Medicine, Bad Behavior: Drug Diversion in America” exhibit in a DEA museum that 
was created “to educate and increase public awareness on prescription drug abuse” (p.614). The title
itself creates a perception of the prescription drugs being morally “good” while the individual using
them is depicted as morally bad. Ultimately, those patients who develop substance use disorders from
using opioids are often labeled as difficult and undeserving as a result of aberrant behaviors and are
thus less likely to receive the treatment they need for both pain management and addiction.
Conclusion
What began with a medical shift towards the increased treatment of pain in the 1990s has
become a public health problem of epidemic proportions. With the drastic increase in prescriptions of 
opioids came the development of a drug market that operates within family, friend, and medical
settings, putting opioids in nearly every household to be taken incorrectly, diverted to other people, or
sold. The academic literature surrounding the nonmedical use of prescription opioids, however,
provides considerable information that can be used to better understand and address the problem. The
information presented about differences in opioid use between the genders suggests the need for 
targeted efforts to address the fact that women are more likely to use opioids as a method for coping
with interpersonal stress than men. The data collected about age highlight that while peak nonmedical
use occurs in the early adult years of approximately 18-21, older adults over the age of 60 require more 
attention to address the higher mortality rates and suicidal intent associated with opioid use. The
higher concentration of nonmedical prescription opioid use in rural areas compared to urban 
demonstrates the need for more resources to be diverted to these relatively isolated locations that have 
been the most adversely affected. The fact that there are still such lower perceptions of harm associated 
with prescription opioid use despite the danger they have posed to public health demonstrates a need
for better education surrounding the actual risks faced by those taking opioids in any capacity. Finally,
it is clear that we should not depict these drugs as morally “good” and the individuals who use them,
become addicted, or are suffering from pain as morally “bad.” The literature has demonstrated that the 
stigma attached to drug use has merely served to fuel the epidemic itself. 
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Lying: A Political Moral Burden 
By: Kennedy Muise
Introduction
Lying as a political leader poses a difficult moral
dilemma. For some, it is never morally excusable for 
politicians to lie. For others, it is morally excusable for a 
politician to lie in some circumstances, but not in others.
According to John Mearsheimer, an American political
scientist, there are many reasons why a politician would lie.
Mearsheimer provides various examples of lying in politics, 
such as to cover-up a policy that turned out badly, to hide a
controversial political strategy, to protect the country’s 
interest, to conceal one’s weakness from an adversary, and
various others(Mearsheimer, 2011). Given these reasons, one
can understand that a politician is often put into positions
where they may have to lie, and these are different than those
positions of the average person. Assuming that politicians lie 
given different sets of circumstances, let’s consider the 
following moral dilemma: I am a recently-elected politician
and through my position, I know that I may have to lie due 
to the complicated nature of politics. What professional moral 
code do I follow to decipher when it is morally excusable to 
lie and when it is not? To create this professional moral code
for politicians, one must consider possible conditions that 
make lying in politics morally excusable. Assuming that lying
is inevitable in politics, it is morally excusable for politicians 
to lie under a professional moral code. This moral code
requires politicians to accept the moral burden associated 
with lying and to express guilt as evidence for feeling the
impacts of this moral burden.
Under this professional moral code for politicians,
lying in politics is morally excusable when the politician
accepts lying as a moral burden, that is a sense of 
responsibility for a decision which has moral implications. It
is important to note that this professional moral code makes
lying morally excusable, not morally justifiable.
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According to Michael Walzer, an American political theorist, the difference between excuses 
and justification is that “an excuse is typically an admission of fault” while “a justification is typically
a denial of fault and an assertion of innocence”(Walzer, 1973). In this way, the moral code presented
here asserts that lying in politics is immoral and a politician who lies is at fault for engaging in this
immoral act. Politicians are not justified or made innocent under this unique moral code for lying but,
are rather pushed to acknowledge and publicly admit their engagement in this immoral act. 
The politician’s professional moral code first makes lying morally excusable if the politician
encounters some level of contemplation before he or she lies. In the essay, “Political Action: the Problem 
of Dirty Hands,” Michael Walzer describes his “mob boss” example. In this example, Walzer explains 
how contemplation is what the public should use to assess the morality of a politician who lied. Walzer 
describes that since the politician was “extremely reluctant even to consider the deal” with the mob 
boss, and because the politician had “scruples of this sort, we know him to be a good man”(Walzer, 
1973). In this way, Walzer argues that although the politician made a deal with the mob boss, he/she is 
morally excused because he/she contemplated it first. This means that the politician knew lying was
immoral, considered the potential consequences, and decided to accept the moral burden of lying. If a 
politician does not contemplate lying and the potential consequences, then the politician would not 
think that it is immoral at all. Therefore, we know that a politician is keeping him/herself to a moral
standard if he/she encounters some level of contemplation before engaging in an immoral act, namely
lying, thereby accepting the burden that comes along with it. 
The second requirement of the politician’s moral code dictates that lying is morally excusable 
when it includes the consultation of others, such as a council or a cabinet. According to Sissela Bok, a 
Swedish-born American philosopher, “only deceptive practices which can be openly debated and 
consented to in advance are justifiable in a democracy”(Bok,1978). Bok believes that lying, or deception, 
is a contradiction to democracy “unless it can be shown that there has been a genuine consent [from 
the public] to deceit”(Bok, 1978). For Bok, Walzer’s argument advocating that private contemplation is 
a moral excuse for lying is not enough to make lying in politics morally excusable. This is because the 
politician did not debate his/her decision with the public or consider the public’s consent to the lie; the 
politician only considered the consequences of lying based on his/her perspective alone without the 
perspective of the public. Therefore, to protect democracy and hold politicians accountable for lying, 
their actions must also be openly debated and consented to in advance by the electorate. 
While Bok’s argument is persuasive, it seems difficult to imagine that a high-ranking politician,
such as the president, would gather consent from the entire public before he/she made a decision. . In
order to make up for this and to also respect Bok’s argument, politicians such as the president, senators, 
and representatives should identify a cabinet or council that can help them make morally challenging 
decisions. In this way, the politician isn’t exactly obtaining the consent of the entire public, but he/she
is considering the voices of others. This may help the politician further consider the necessity to lie and
the implications of lying outside of his/her personal moral perspective. By consulting others before
lying, the politician is again displaying that he/she is concerned about lying, knows it to be an immoral 
act, and accepts the moral burden which makes lying morally excusable under the politician’s 
professional moral code.
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Finally, the last requirement of the politician’s moral code is that the politician must express 
guilt as evidence that he/she understands the impacts of the moral burden associated with lying. It is 
important to understand that the politician must not only feel guilty for lying, but he/she must also
publicly express this guilt. This shows that the politician not only accepts the moral burden of lying, 
but the politician also feels bad about acting immoral to the point that he/she is willing to publicly 
admit to it. Referring back to Walzer, he explains another moral dilemma about a politician’s decision 
to authorize the torture of a captured rebel leader who might know the location of bombs hidden
around a city. After presenting this example, Walzer argues that the politician’s decision to torture the
rebel leader is morally excused because the politician feels guilty about his/her decision, the politician
acknowledged the moral crime he/she committed, and the politician ultimately accepted the moral
burden that came along with it(Walzer, 1973). Using Walzer’s argument, one can make the case that 
lying as a politician is morally excusable when the politician feels guilty about lying after the fact.
However, as Bok argued above, the politician’s feelings of guilt are not enough to make lying morally 
excusable. Instead, it is best to combine Walzer’s and Bok’s arguments to say that the politician should
feel guilty about lying and he/she should publicly acknowledge, and potentially even apologize to the
public, for engaging in an immoral act. This combination of Walzer’s and Bok’s argument is
particularly persuasive because it pushes the politician to publicly admit that he/she has engaged in a
wrongful act; by publicly expressing one’s guilt, the politician holds him/herself accountable for acting 
immoral and allows the public to hold the politician accountable as well. 
Volume 9, Issue 1: Spring 2019 14
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Bok, Sissela. “Lies for The Public Good.” In Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, 165-181. 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.  
Mearsheimer, John J.. “Strategic Cover-ups." In Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International 
Politics, 43-46. Cary: Oxford University Press USA- OSO, 2011. 
Walzer, Michael. “Political Action: the Problem of Dirty Hands.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 2 
(Winter 1973): 160-180. 
Volume 9, Issue 1: Spring 2019 15
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
in need. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
The Nyanza Superfund Site: The 
Effects of an Environmental 
Crime on a Community 
By: Erika Dennery and the Fall 2018 Crimes of the Powerful
Class
Introduction 
Environmental crimes have been taking place across the
United States for years, going mostly unnoticed in the 
modern industrial society. Environmental crime refers to a
variety of behaviors that violate existing environmental 
regulations as well as unregulated willful harms to the 
environment and human health. Corporations who act 
negligently in their waste disposal can unknowingly commit
environmental crimes by not being aware of how their 
actions can harm others. Harms to the environment that arise 
from corporate actions do not only include deliberate actions
but also lack of action or negligent actions. Ignoring 
regulations with no regard for the implications should also 
be viewed as deviant behavior. Although many provisions 
address “knowing violations,” actions that are performed as
a result of recklessness or negligence need to be included in
the definition of environmental harms (Harrell, Lisa, &
Votaw, 2009). 
The crimes of Nyanza Color & Chemical Co., are a
prime example of an environmental crime. In 1982 this was
one of the first sites to be deemed a Superfund site, a site that 
has been contaminated by hazardous waste and that poses a
threat to human health and the environment. Nyanza Color 
& Chemical Co., Inc. was a synthetic dye manufacturing 
company operating in Ashland, Massachusetts from 1917 to 
1978. The site was deemed hazardous in 1971 when pollution
was found in the nearby Sudbury River due to improper 
waste disposal which contaminated the surrounding areas. 
Approximately twenty years after Nyanza ceased 
operations, the residents that had grown up playing in the
contaminated areas of Ashland found themselves 
developing rare forms of cancer. Government cleanup 
actions were influenced by these illnesses, and their impact 
About the Author
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crime that took place in Ashland,
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To do this, the paper begins by elaborating on the role of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in curbing environmental harm. A description of dye and chemical manufacturing is
provided to determine the extent to which these processes were harmful to the environment and
human life. Finally, the experience of those affected by the contamination is explained and the 
various community actions that were taken to achieve justice are discussed. 
Class Research
To conduct this research, students in the Crimes of the Powerful class organized a case study
on the Ashland Nyanza incident and site. The main goal was to identify if the Nyanza case
constitutes an environmental crime, what effects this event had on the local community, and the 
roles of the corporation and the state in this case. 
To compile the case study, various sources of information were consulted. These sources 
include government documents from the EPA & the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
(MDPH), analyzing interviews with community members, a site visit, studies on chemical 
contamination, and other open source information. This research was also built on work compiled
by Dan Borelli and Marie Kane, community members and activists who lost friends and family to 
cancer due to the improper waste disposal at Nyanza. 
Environmental Harm and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Prior to the creation of the EPA, environmental concerns were widely unregulated (Lewis,
1985). The EPA was officially established on December 2, 1970, in response to discussions regarding
growing environmental problems. The original goals of the EPA were to establish and enforce
environmental protection standards, to combat environmental pollution, and to develop and
recommend to the President new policies for environmental protection (Lewis, 1985). Due to the
mismanagement of waste disposal, Congress responded by holding hearings about the dangers of
toxic dumping in 1979 (Lewis, 1985). After a year of deliberations, Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). This act 
created the Superfund program which fell under the jurisdiction of the EPA. A Superfund site is 
defined as any land contaminated by hazardous waste. The EPA identify such sites as candidates
for cleanup because they pose a risk to human health or the environment. Once identified, these sites
are placed on the National Priorities List (NPL). 
In 1981, The Nyanza Chemical Waste Dump, located in Ashland, Massachusetts, was ranked 
in the top ten sites on the EPA’s Interim National Priority List of 115 sites (Engineering and Science 
Unit, 1990). The cleanup plan for the Nyanza site was to be addressed in five stages: one initial action 
phase and four long-term remedial actions. The long-term phases included source control, cleanup
of the soil, off-site groundwater, wetlands, and the Sudbury River. To control the contamination, the
EPA excavated all outlying sludge deposits and contaminated soil and sediment. The hill on which 
the contamination occurred was capped off to divert surface and groundwater flow around the
contaminated area. The system was designed to prevent human contact with the contaminated area
as well as to prevent contaminated soils from entering ground and surface water. The cap spanned 
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13.5 acres and the EPA spent $14 million in order to make it possible (Environmental Protection 
Agency, 1991). 
Dye Manufacturing & Chemical Contamination in Ashland
In 1917, U.S. Color & Chemical Co. was established in Ashland when the import of dyes from
Germany to the U.S. was halted during World War I. In 1926 the corporation was renamed to U.S.
Chemical & Dye Co., and its merge with Nyanza Color & Chemical Co in 1930 gave the site its
current name. Nyanza was producing a number of different aniline and alizarin colors for different
fabrics, as well as textile chemicals such as synthetic detergents and water-proofing compounds
(Nyanza Color and Chemical Company, 2006). 
One of the biggest impacts of the Nyanza Chemical Site was the contamination of groundwater 
and sediments in the surrounding areas by chemicals that can lead to cancer. Cellular organisms
were damaged due to the toxic metals that were disposed of improperly and the metal ions which 
were discarded have been found to cause DNA damage. This damage occurs through an interaction 
with nuclear proteins that can cause conformational changes which leads to cell cycle modulation 
like carcinogenesis or apoptosis (Tchounwou, et. al, 2014).  
The EPA mandates that a minimum criterion be applied to all surface waters. It states that they 
must be pollutant free, there should be no odor, color, or radioactive substances, and they should be 
free of any toxins that are dangerous to humans, wildlife or aquatic life (EPA, 2010). The buried and
expelled waste from Nyanza contaminated the soil and groundwater at the site, and a large cocktail
of over 100 different chemicals remains underground today (ACAC, n.d.). Pollution in the brooks 
and wetlands traveled to the Sudbury River, which carried the chemicals downstream and spread 
the contamination beyond the town of Ashland (DARRP, 2018). Nyanza’s widespread 
contamination was in direct violation of the EPA’s environmental standards and regulations; it was
an ongoing environmental harm that the company was aware of yet still allowed to continue.
Two studies conducted in 1990 by the MDPH looked at the elevation of kidney and bladder
cancer in the area. The first study was conducted in response to finding chemicals at the site that
were already linked to an increased risk of kidney and bladder cancer (MDPH, 2006). When this 
study did not reveal a pattern, the MDPH analyzed data on residents who were between the ages of 
ten and eighteen years old between 1965 and 1985. This study focused on a cluster of five men with 
rare sarcomas and also found that out of 1,387 study participants, 73 reported having cancer (MDPH,
2006). The study found that there was a raised cancer rate during the time of contamination which
was statistically significant (MDPH, 2006). Study participants who reported activities related to any
type of water contact near the Nyanza plant, specifically swimming or wading, showed an increased 
risk of cancer diagnosis which was statistically significant. The increased risk of cancer was two to 
three times greater than the risk of cancer for participants who reported no contact with these areas
of the Nyanza site. Further, for individuals who reported water contact and a family history of
cancer, the risk of cancer increased to nearly four times the risk of participants who reported no
family history of cancer (MDPH, 2006). These results were limited to residents who were children 
at the time of contamination; teachers and other residents 
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of the Ashland community who could have been contaminated by Nyanza’s waste disposal were 
not included in the study.
Victims of the Ashland Nyanza Contamination 
In Ashland, the victims of the contamination can be grouped into three different categories, 
direct, indirect, and unknowing victims. Direct victims are those who are directly affected by a 
crime, which can include mental and physical harm (Rothe & Kauzlarich, 2016). Indirect victims are 
those who feel the impacts of a crime but are not directly victimized (Rothe & Kauzlarich, 2016). 
Unknowing victims are those that are unaware they are being victimized because they see harmful 
behavior as normal and therefore accept it. 
An example of a direct victim is Kevin Kane, who was the ninth child in his family. In high 
school he played football, wrestled, ran track, and was the captain of the golf team. Kevin graduated 
college in 1994 and became a case-worker for the Department of Social Services. Kevin died in 1998, 
a year after his cancer diagnosis. His death was a catalyst that prompted the community to take
action in an effort to get justice (Kevin Kane’s Life, n.d.). Another direct victim of this case was David
Keddy, who was diagnosed with the rare Ewing’s Sarcoma two weeks after his high school 
graduation and died two years later. Indirect victims, in this case, were the community and family 
members that witnessed the loss and pain of loved ones, such as Kevin and David.  
Unknowing victims are those that are affected but unaware of the problem. Unknowing victims 
may even be facilitators of their own victimization through compliance, support, consumption, or 
complacency in light of rights and freedoms being limited or retracted by a corporation or the state.
People willingly accept these limitations and the resulting victimization, or have normalized the 
resulting harms. In this case, those living in Ashland were used to the Nyanza site operating as a
part of the community. Despite some in the community rallying together to make a change, many 
remain unaware or complacent in the company’s environmental crimes.
Community Action 
The Nyanza corporation acted as a criminal organization, and as a whole was culpable for the illegal 
dumping of thousands of tons of toxic waste (EPA, n.d.). Orders by officials in the company lead to
dumping. Just as important, however, was the lack of action taken by others that were aware of the 
dumping but chose not to react. Nyanza chose to neglect environmental regulations and prioritize 
saving money over abiding by important environmental policies. For Nyanza and other businesses,
environmental regulations may be seen as an obstruction to their efficiency because reducing costs
is paramount. These corporations do not realize the true extent of the harm that their actions can
cause. Furthermore, the impacts of these crimes are widespread, and the perpetrators are difficult
to catch. Environmental crime is often a crime of the powerful. Those with wealth and authority can
influence the criminal justice system to reflect their interests. This allows the powerful to manipulate 
environmental programs and how they are enforced. The dangers posed by environmental crime 
are seen with the example of Nyanza where corporate interests collided with environmental 
regulations.
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Due to the lack of action and enforcement by the government, community members felt the 
need to fight for justice relentlessly over the course of several decades. The Ashland Citizens Action
Committee (ACAC), a community group, was created to bring awareness to the problem of the
chemical contamination. This group also focuses its efforts on bringing awareness to the lack of
cleanup at the Nyanza site as well as to ensure that the government conducted the necessary cleanup 
operations. Even today, ACAC’s main goal is to prevent others from being affected by the 
contamination.  
Conclusion 
The Nyanza Superfund site in Ashland, Massachusetts is an example of an environmental
crime with widespread impacts. Throughout their years in operation, the company generated large
quantities of industrial waste, which were not disposed of properly despite existing regulations.
Environmental regulations were willfully ignored, and waste was discharged from the site into the
surrounding environment without any regard to the impact on the environment or human life. 
Pollution in the brooks and wetlands travelled to the Sudbury River, which carried the chemicals 
downstream and spread the contamination beyond the town of Ashland (DARRP, 2018). The 
pollution in the environment created health issues for animals, plants, and citizens of Ashland. These 
impacts, along with other environmental harms such as soil contamination and deaths of fish,
amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals, indicate Nyanza is an example of an environmental crime
(DARRP, 2018).
This site now serves as a reminder of the dangers of unchecked corporate action. The impacts 
on the town of Ashland prove the severity of damage that can be caused by environmental crime. 
Nyanza was aware of the potential harm of the waste they were dumping but they continued to do
so anyway. When the government finally got involved with the cleanup process, their operations
were drawn out and lacked the requisite urgency. The actions of the community were essential to 
ensure the government fulfilled its mandate, but even today it remains an incomplete process. The
government was complicit through its inaction, making it easier for Nyanza to illegally dump waste
and thus easier for others to do the same in the future. The Ashland residents continue to fight for 
their right to a clean and safe environmenta right that they should have been granted in the first 
place. Environmental crimes have the potential to affect everyone, and therefore it is paramount to
be involved in community action so that no harm goes unnoticed. These crimes continue to take
place all across the United States and they only gain attention once irreversible harm to human lives 
has already been done. It is time that corporations are held accountable for their crimes, and it is
time that communities come together to hold them accountable.
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Effects of Globalization on Female 
Health in Sub-Saharan Africa 
By: Paige Ferreira
Introduction
The imperial residue from colonization and the aftermath
of a western country colonizing a peripheral nation has created 
many different forms of economic, political, and regional
instability. The consequences from colonization degrade the 
prosperity and economic livelihood of people within these
nations. Consequently, one of the greatest victims of
socioeconomic degradation are Sub-Saharan women. Sub-
Saharan women are at a disadvantage regarding maternal
responsibilities, economic stability, and specifically public health. 
As the wave of globalization has brought prosperity and 
advancement across Europe and North America, the positive
effects of international economic influence along the periphery 
are much more difficult to reconcile.  While globalization has 
brought foreign dollars into the economies of developing nations,
it has also sparked political turmoil, migration, and other forms 
of political and social uncertainty.  International measures to 
assist women in the periphery, especially sub-Saharan African 
nations, need to promote economic equality as well as political
equality in order to achieve true progress.
Legacy of Globalization in Sub Saharan Africa
Worldwide globalization is the liberal exchange of goods,
capital, and labor among countries, which has sparked immense
economic growth, especially in Westernized nations. Historically, 
the repercussions of colonization can still be felt in Sub-Saharan 
regions where the aftereffects of “extractive” colonial policies
“did little to protect property rights, support market
development, or stimulate other economic activity” (Rodrik, 2011,
p. xiv). These consequences have created a precedent and legacy 
restricting the economies of developing nations. Additionally, 
globalization’s effect on women in
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developing nations has created a paradox of whether foreign influence will “improve the lives of all 
citizens, including women” or “worsen existing inequalities as well as create new ones” (Richards and
Gelleny, 2007, p.857).  The well-being of the female population is a significant inroad to a more
globalized and progressive economy in the SSA.  This then requires a re-thinking of international
interventions to repair the lingering effects of colonization and to prevent further global exploitation 
in Sub-Saharan nations.
Globalization Widens Economic Gaps in SSA
Since the early 1990s, globalization has set into motion a new world order where countries vie 
for economic advantages.  Globally, competition has replaced the “fear that a lack of reform would 
cause social and political turmoil” (Rosanvallon, 2016, p.16) as were the concerns of nations in the early
part of the twentieth century.  The onset of World War II served as an aftereffect of the political turmoil
and economic disparities brought on by the Great Depression. Globalization has replaced the “fear” 
that economic inequalities will spark war or violence among nations.  No longer are nations working
to suspend political differences through social programs that bridge vast economic inequalities.  Today,
globalization is an economic force that rewards wealthier nations and “further emphasizes the gap that
exists between the world's rich and the world's poor” (McCann, 2006, p.293).  While globalization has
sparked “rising fortunes of the developed world, particularly China and India,” its effect on Sub-
Saharan nations has been fraught with more negative than positive consequences (Bourguignon 11).  
     In many of these developing nations, governments and their political structures have underutilized 
a significant resource---the inclusion of women in political, social, and economic realms. The 
oppression of women along with inherent inequalities has never been more prevalent than in the
nations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Women in Sub-Saharan African nations have been subjected to poor 
living conditions and the negative effects of patriarchal governments since colonization.  The effects
have limited women in both social, political, and economic terms.  Women are denied property rights, 
proper healthcare, education, and autonomy because of archaic social institutions and cultural taboos,
which not only hinder their life expectancies and access to vital health care, but also stunt any economic
or social progress.  The governments of Sub-Saharan African nations and the international community 
fail to realize that globalization will not be successful unless the economic, political, and civil rights of 
females are improved. 
Health, Education and Maternal Duties
Women are the primary providers of healthcare within the home, yet they are underrepresented
in the healthcare industry.  While globalization is intended to “facilitate higher government
expenditures on health, education, and other services that would directly benefit women,” based on
the state of health and education for many African women, the opposite is true (Richards and Gelleny, 
2007, p. 858). Women account for over half the population in Africa (WHO).  However, the region
experiences a high maternal mortality rate, which the organization deems to be “largely preventable”
(WHO). Additionally, Sub-Saharan women suffer from other “noncommunicable” diseases such as
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and cancer at higher rates than their Western counterparts (WHO).
Women’s inadequate healthcare is determined by many “international forces” that mute the female 
Volume 9, Issue 1: Spring 2019 23
       
 
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
voice in advocating for better healthcare for both women and their families (Richards and Gelleny, 
2007, p. 858). This public health crisis prevents women from participating in the economy and reaping 
the rewards of globalization.  Government officials miss the “interconnectedness” between women’s
health and economic gain (WHO).   
Suppression of the Female Voice
      In addition to limited healthcare, women are also denied full access to education because of forces
beyond their control including a lack of voice to control their own destinies.  These forces limit women’s
participation in their local economies, which in turn hinder the benefits of globalization.  Furthermore,
women’s education is not only affected by economic limitations, but also “social stereotyping that
keeps girls at home” (WHO).  Women’s roles are perceived to be more related to domestic service to
the family.  When a mother dies, it is the female members of the family who must step up to care for 
younger siblings and manage the household duties.  This responsibility often means that girls will have
to drop out of school.  In extreme cases, girls are “forced into early marriage in times of drought to
secure a bride-price that will guarantee the survival of...families until the next season” (Lake and
Mugwendere, 2005, p. 132).  Unfortunately, domestic roles are not the only inhibitors to a girl’s
education.
     Poverty is another factor in Sub-Saharan Africa that negatively affects the education of girls more 
than boys. Often, women do not attend school because of the costs associated with education.  Priority 
is often given to male members of the family first as “gender biases regarding the perceived higher
value of boys’ education over that of girls” (Wangari, Kamau, Kinyau, 2008, p. 298).  Lastly, the lack of 
“sanitary wear” often forces girls to stay home because they cannot afford to purchase proper and safe
forms of menstrual protection (Lake and Mugwendere, 2005, p. 134).  In Ghana last year, menstruating 
girls were prohibited from crossing the Ghana River, essentially preventing them from attending
school (BBC).  The larger repercussions related to girls dropping out of school are their inability to
participate in a “virtuous cycle” of opportunity offered through a formal education (Lake and 
Mugwendere, 2005, p.132). 
Female Education and Economic Vitality: Educate a Woman, Feed a Village 
       Girls who are educated become educated women who yield strong economic power as well as
serving as role models for others girls to attend school.  The economic vitality of a female education 
benefits not only the individual, but also the entire family.  Families with educated women have lower 
pregnancy rates, lower poverty, and a greater opportunity to realize the relationship “between 
investment in education and economic returns for individuals and nations” (Mukudi, 2002, p. 234). 
Women are uneducated have a greater chance of unwanted pregnancies and are at a greater chance of
being poor. Education is directly connected to “the economic cost of maternal and newborn mortality
[which] is over US $15 billion annually in terms of lost potential productivity, of which roughly half is
attributed to women and half to newborns” (WHO).  Therefore, the education of girls has a positive 
effect on an entire nation's economy “where a one percentage point increase in female education raises 
the average gross domestic product (GDP) by 0.3 percentage points and raises annual GDP growth
rates by 0.2 percentage points” (Bourne). Moreover, as globalization has advanced the economies 
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within the SSA, the need for more high-tech jobs has increased.  However, because of gender gaps in 
education, these nations cannot meet the needs of more qualified workers where “nearly half of East
African employers in a 2014 survey cited a lack of skills as the major reason they did not fill vacancies”
(Council on Foreign Relations).  Essentially, women’s well-being is inextricably linked to globalization
and economic vitality of the SSA.      
Globalization Sparks Demand for Cash Crops; Limits Food Productions 
Globalization has also negatively impacted land reform policies in Sub-Saharan Africa as greater
demands for cash crops such as tobacco often receive high priority over food production.  In countries
like Kenya, women produce “80 percent of food in Africa” (Wangari et al, 2008, p. 295). Additionally,
land is also the main source of collateral to secure loans and is in itself a significant form of currency.
However, in many Sub-Saharan African nations, women are prohibited from owning land or own a
fraction of land, if permitted in the individual African nation.  Often, land ownership is connected to a
woman’s husband or family.  Seldom do women own land independently of a man. Women are faced 
with a difficult proposition as their labor becomes less focused on food production and more
concentrated in working for global interests to expand “consumption of resources which disadvantage
the Third World” (Wangari et al, 2008, p. 292).  Moreover, Sub-Saharan African nations have a 
disadvantage in competing globally and often must lower the costs of agricultural products because of
an inability to meet the price demands that are easily reached by Western nations who yield the same
products. Western nations have an advantage through technological advancements that allow for 
higher crop production, which translates into an ability to produce and sell crops cheaper. 
Subsequently, Sub-Saharan nations must in turn lower prices for their crops to compete with the lower 
prices offered by more developed nations.  These actions translate into lower profits for the periphery. 
Even within Africa, northern nations control the flow of agricultural products and the assigned tariffs
that accompany them.  Essentially, Sub-Saharan nations have no control over the products they sell on
the market, and these countries are subjected to an economic system that is stacked against them.  This
scenario, in turn, causes mass migrations of women and families who seek to find more accessible land
to maintain a living standard.  
Lack of Land Agency in SSA Equals Human Rights Violations 
The SSA women’s inability to voice their opinion or control their land stems from a violation of 
their human rights.  The lack of voice and control over land highlights a significant element in
globalization’s effect on Sub-Saharan women.  The economic ambitions of international organizations 
are the major players of human rights abuses in the SSA. The introduction of foreign interests in Sub-
Saharan Africa have given women limited voice in shaping economic policies.  This limited voice has
been powerless in shifting land use from exporting cash crops to utilizing land for food production. 
Profits are prioritized before the welfare of people--especially women, who are the primary growers of
food. International rights organizations such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women have worked to emphasize that “women’s rights are human rights”
(Wangari et al, 2008, p. 293).  The actions of the United Nations to equate women’s well-being to human
rights are intended to highlight the inherent abuse that exists with private control of land and give
nations more autonomy over private corporations, who are often the “principal violators of human 
Volume 9, Issue 1: Spring 2019 25
       
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
rights” (Wangari et al, 2008, p. 293). An example of this abuse is evident in the utilization of contract
farming in many nations in the SSA.  Here, foreign corporations contract local farmers to produce
certain cash crops or other highly profitable crops.  However, this practice is often fraught with
inequalities against women as it “shifts land away from food crops and allocates resources to the
production of urban or export-oriented crops” (Weatherspoon, Cacho, & Christy, 2001, p. 725). 
Essentially, globalization at the hands of international corporations are creating impediments to
women’s progress by inhibiting women’s access to land both for sustenance and for economic reasons.
Rather than a measure of “livelihood” for women and their families, globalization has transformed
land into “cash crops for Western consumers” (Wangari et al, 2008, p. 292).  
Protection of Third World Women from Western Capitalizers 
     The international community needs to ensure that women in the periphery are protected against the 
profit-seeking entrepreneurs who tout the benefits of globalization while ravaging the lives of women 
and other poverty-stricken people in the SSA. International monitoring systems and individual SSA
nations must ensure that women are healthy, educated, economically-fit, and land owners in order to
facilitate better. The effects of globalization are producing a paradoxical effect; instead of bringing 
profits and better living conditions to these areas, globalization is  driving greater income inequalities 
between the rich and poor. Globalization continues to affect living conditions in some African nations
where “life expectancy has dropped to the mid thirties from being almost sixty in the 1970s” (McCann,
2006, p. 295).  The identifiers of whether a nation is cultivating an atmosphere of inequality and poverty 
are best measured in its treatment and well-being of women as women are the primary caregivers in
the home. 
Assistance from IGOS and Western States
     The first step in addressing the ill-treatment of women in Sub-Saharan African nations is to 
recognize that the solutions lie with international human rights organizations. A global effort must
recognize and concede that women are largely the victims of human rights violations in the SSA. Thus, 
more effective protections are needed that specifically target those acts perpetrated against women 
since these acts are gender specific and impact a woman’s ability to prosper both socially and
economically. Women’s ability to maintain economic independence and to demonstrate buying power 
is the key to both proper access to healthcare and education. For this reason, the international 
community should prioritize SSA women’s economic rights.  International corporations need to take
on a greater moral responsibility in ensuring that women in the SSA are not removed from resources 
that they depend on.  Examples of these resources are water and land for farming.  If need be, greater
measuring systems from international rights organizations should be requirements in order to do
business in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Additionally, both corporations and individual nations need to join
together to recognize the importance of land to a woman’s livelihood and ability to be successful
economically and socially.  This success is not limited to women, but also affects the overall economy 
of the SSA. Land in the SSA continues to be a source of empowerment that helps women obtain
healthcare and an education, as land sometimes is a form of currency.  Women need to be allowed to
purchase land outside of their family.  In addition to addressing economic rights, women’s right to 
education needs to be enforced.  Education should also inc include “legal literacy.” This knowledge
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equips women with the procedures and laws that protect them, so that women and girls can participate
in citizenship policies that affect their well-being.  Legal literacy gives women the voice they lack in
changing or at least speaking out against policies that limit their autonomy.  As globalization moves
more steadily into the SSA, international rights organization need to monitor the effects of globalization
on women, and if needed, institute processes that protect the region’s primary resource--women. 
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Introduction
Although the Sandinista Revolution occurred nearly 40
years ago, Nicaragua still struggles to consolidate the
democracy that the revolution instituted. With a history of 
outside intervention and struggles against the United States, 
Nicaragua has faced a tumultuous journey to democratic
consolidation. Specifically, under President Daniel Ortega,
Nicaragua exhibits warning signs of a potential slip back to 
authoritarianism that the Sandinista Revolution intended to
end. Since Ortega took power in 2007, he has weakened 
democratic institutions such as the judiciary, and he has
consolidated his power in all branches of government.
Electoral exploitation has increased, and corruption has 
worsened without effective institutional blocks. 
Colonial Legacies
As a former Spanish colony, Nicaragua has battled the legacies
of colonialism throughout its history and on its path towards
democracy. When the Spanish arrived in 1524, the indigenous
peoples faced disease and forced labor in the mines of Peru
that decimated the population-- a decrease from one million
before colonization to 50,000 by the 1540s (Wiarda and Kline
377, Vanden and Prevost 572). Therefore, without a large
indigenous population, Nicaragua lacked “significant racial,
linguistic, [and] religious differences,” and instead,
ideological cleavages emerged (Vanden and Prevost 571). As 
Rustow contends, “conflict and reconciliation are essential to
democracy,” and thus divisions emerged between the
Conservatives in Grenada and the Liberals in León (Rustow 
338, Vanden and Prevost 572). Aligned with the Catholic
Church and composed of the aristocratic class, the
Conservatives engaged in economic rivalry with the Liberals,
a group of lower class colonizers in León who relied on
international trade and were loosely connected with ideas
about democracy and progress (Vanden and Prevost 572, 593).
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Independence and Intervention 
With independence from Spain won in 1821 and state sovereignty gained in 1838, the Liberals 
and Conservatives continued to struggle for control of the nation while outside intervention from 
Britain and the United States intensified tensions within the state (Vanden and Prevost 573). In a 
dispute over control of the mouth of the San Juan River, Britain and the Vanderbilt Transit Company 
signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850 and agreed to work together on a transoceanic transit
route—a decision made without the input of Nicaraguan government, even though the river mouth 
falls within their borders (Vanden and Prevost 573). Additionally, in 1855, the Liberals hired an
American, William Walker, to organize a force against the Conservatives in Grenada, and Walker 
became president until he was exiled in 1857 (Vanden and Prevost 573). These instances of outside
intervention continued into the twentieth century and characterize much of Nicaragua’s history. 
Under Liberal dictator José Antonio Zelaya’s rule from 1893 to 1909, the globalization of
coffee cultivation allowed the elites to “dispossess peasants and Indian farmers in the northern
highlands” which led to peonage—debt servitude—on coffee plantations (Booth, Wade, Walker 98). 
The United States encouraged the overthrow of Zelaya and the institution of a Conservative leader; 
however, the Conservative-backed leader performed poorly, and a widespread rebellion occurred
that the U.S. eventually put down (Booth et al. 98). The U.S. then remained in Nicaragua from 1912
to 1932 after a war between the resistance, led by Augusto Sandino, and the partnership of the U.S.
Marines and the Nicaraguan National Guard (Booth et al. 99). The leader of the Nicaraguan National
Guard, General Anastasio Somoza García, had Sandino assassinated and then consolidated power 
by establishing the Somoza family dynasty that would last until 1979 (Booth et al. 99). 
The Somoza Family Dynasty (1937-1979)
The new Somoza government was repressive and depended on the United States and the
corrupt National Guard for support (Booth et al. 99). Despite the rapid industrialization and 
economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s, the policies of the Somoza government left the people 
impoverished with union repression and low wages. Nicaraguans suffered increased income
inequality, a rise in unemployment, and “a palpable drop in their ability to feed and shelter their 
families” (Booth et al. 100). This economic turmoil inflicted on low and middle-class Nicaraguans 
resulted in the appearance of new opposition groups such as the Democratic Liberation Union, anti-
Somoza factions of the old Liberal and Conservative parties, and the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) (Booth et al. 102). The FSLN initially failed to mobilize popular support in their
guerilla effort against the Somoza government. However, people increasingly lost faith in the failing
Luis Somoza Debayle government with its blatant human rights violations and exploitation of the 
Christmas Earthquake for personal gain. As a result, the opposition forces united under FSLN
leadership as the National Patriotic Front and overthrew the Somoza dynasty (Booth et al. 102, 
Vanden and Prevost 579). 
Challenges to Democratic Government
In 1979, the opposition coalition led by the FSLN assumed power in the National Directorate, 
but several challenges still stood in the way of constructing a new democratic government. For 
example, one obstacle facing the new FSLN-led government was how to deal with the human rights 
abuses of the previous regime.
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Although many of the Sandinista leaders “were victims of torture,” the Ministry of the
Interior, Thomás Borge Martínez, “tried to keep human rights violations low” when trying previous
leaders for those past abuses (Merrill 39). Although the unjustly treated prisoners of the Somoza era 
“were given a trial” under the new Sandinista government, Nicaragua never fully reconciled with 
its past (Merrill 40). Because the “political leaders have little incentive to redress historical injustices
of the revolutionary era” (BTI 2016) and benefit from these cleavages, there has not been a wide-
scale effort to deal with the human rights violations of the past. 
Another challenge facing the FSLN-led coalition surrounded the party composition of the
new ruling body. The FSLN took power within a broad coalition composed of groups with different 
ideas about Nicaragua’s future: middle and upper-class groups (Conservatives, Liberals, and Social
Christians) wanted political power for themselves within the traditional party structure while the
Sandinistas (peasantry and urban poor) wanted more radical social, economic, and political change 
(Vanden and Prevost 580). Using the Council of the State, the Sandinista government organized land 
reform, expanded health care and education, and “broadened its diplomatic contacts to include 
Eastern European socialist countries and the Non-Aligned Movement,” which provoked the US
opposition to the Sandinistas (Vanden and Prevost 581). 
With the 1984 elections approaching, the Reagan administration attempted to isolate 
Nicaragua and overturn the recent revolution as an extension of the Cold War (Booth et al. 106). 
Accordingly, the U.S. gave the CIA $19.8 million to establish an exile-army of counterrevolutionaries
(Contras) to defeat the Sandinistas (Booth et al. 106). However, despite the economic and
humanitarian atrocities committed during this guerilla war, the FSLN defeated the Contras with 
substantial help from the Soviet Union (Vanden and Prevost 582). Despite the devastated economy 
and the 30,000 lives lost in the conflict, Nicaragua held its first honest elections in 1984 that were
“open to all Nicaraguan citizens sixteen years of age and above” (Vanden and Prevost 582).
Constitution of 1987 and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation 
Winning the election of 1984, the Sandinistas led the construction of the Constitution of 1987
and styled their government after those of the West in order to “legitimize Sandinista power”
(Vanden and Prevost 581). The Constitution established a presidential system with four branches 
of government—the executive, the legislative, the judicial, and the electoral—and with a system of 
checks and balances. However, many of these limitations on power have been either constitutionally
amended or ignored, especially under Daniel Ortega (Cherry 2014). The executive branch functions 
as the most powerful of the four branches with a “large administrative apparatus” and the 
president’s right to appoint justices to the Supreme Court (Vanden and Prevost 588). Nicaragua’s
unicameral legislature, the National Assembly, comprises 90 members that are elected through a 
mix of proportional representation. This institution has the power to oversee the budget, to summon 
the president and minister, and to appoint members to the electoral council (Vanden and Prevost
588). 
The judicial branch houses the Nicaraguan Supreme Court made up of 16 justices, and like 
the president and members of the National Assembly, justices serve five-year terms (Vanden and
Prevost 588). Importantly, the Supreme Court lacks the power of judicial review, and thus its
primary obligation is “applying and interpreting laws rather than making them”(Vanden and  
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Prevost 588). The fourth branch of the government contains the Supreme Electoral Council that
oversees Nicaraguan elections. The electoral branch, like the judicial and legislative, has increasingly 
lost legitimacy overtime as presidents such as Ortega consolidate their power and manipulate the 
original constitutional design intended to create a representative democracy. 
With the promulgation of the Constitution of 1987, Nicaragua began its path to democratic
consolidation. As Larry Diamond contends, one of the threats facing liberal democracy stems from
the “erosion of traditional mediating institutions: established parties and mass media” and “weak
and inefficient political institutions” (Diamond 2017) such as political parties. Correspondingly,
although Nicaragua’s party system initially began to consolidate, over time, it has weakened with 
the deterioration of the right-wing opposition and the consolidation of power in the FSLN under 
Ortega. Specifically, in the 1990 election, two parties emerged with ideological differences—the 
FSLN and the anti-Sandinista coalition, the UNO—and competed in a competitive election (Vanden 
and Prevost 595). However, because “defeated presidential candidates who win over 1 percent of
the vote are given a seat” in the National Assembly, the party system further fragmented (Wiarda 
and Kline 381). Therefore, by 2001, the Conservatives won only one seat, and its presidential
candidate received only 1.4 percent of the vote—a weakening of the conservative opposition to 
Ortega’s FSLN and Alemán’s Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) (Wiarda and Kline 383).
Additionally, although the electoral system initially allowed for many parties to compete in
elections, after 2000, “changes in the electoral laws and pact politics between the PLC and FSLN
reduced the number of parties competing at the national level” (Vanden and Prevost 594). Thus, the
political opposition to the two liberal parties weakened. As a result, “it is not clear whether 
Nicaragua can generate a stable and truly competitive national party system in which the party of
the left—as well as the party of the right—can compete for the presidency with a real chance to win” 
(Anderson 278). By 2011, “a hegemonic party system has developed in Nicaragua,” in contrast to
the two or three-party systems of the past (BTI 2016).
Specifically, the change of the electoral system has permitted the further consolidation of power in
the executive branch and the prominent political parties. This consolidation of executive power 
has ultimately undermined the legitimacy of Nicaragua's political system and reduced citizens’ 
faith in their democracy. With the U.S. intervention and pressure to remove the Sandinistas from 
power, Nicaragua voted out the FSLN in the 1990 election (Vanden and Prevost 582). Most
significantly, however, “the FSLN became the first revolutionary group in Latin American history 
to cede power to an opposition force” (Vanden and Prevost 582). Nevertheless, this type of election 
did not last, and politicians began manipulating the electoral system to consolidate power. For 
instance, the Alemán-Ortega Pact of 1999, among other things, “rewrote electoral law to advantage 
the [PLC] and the FSLN at the expense of all other parties and political movements,” which 
resulted in “sharp reductions of smaller-party representation” (Wiarda and Kline 119). This pact 
led to the resignation of several Sandinistas who rejected the “undermining [of] important party 
principles of democracy and pluralism” (Wiarda and Kline 119). Moreover, another constitutional 
deal between Alemán and Ortega allowed a presidential candidate to win an election with only 35 
percent of the vote and a margin of 5 percent over the next candidate (Vanden and Prevost 595). 
With this change in electoral thresholds, Ortega won the 2006 presidential election and returned 
the FSLN to power for the first time since 1990.
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Ortega and the Threat to Nicaraguan Democracy Today 
With the FSLN back in power, the manipulation of the electoral system continued under 
Ortega. Although the Nicaraguan Constitution provides for a Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) 
intended to protect elections and prevent fraud, it has grown largely ineffective and inefficient with
the changes initiated by the FSLN and the Liberals in 2000. They eliminated “provisions requiring 
broad representation of political parties in the administration of local polling stations and giving the
CSE virtual carte blanche in the appointment of these officials… This ensured that the FSLN and the 
Liberals would have to agree on members and that smaller parties would have no effective voice in
the process” (Wiarda and Kline 382). Essentially, the destabilization of the CSE paved the way to the
allegations of fraud in the 2008 and 2012 municipal elections and the 2011 presidential election
(Booth et al. 124). In particular, in the 2011 presidential election, the European Union’s election 
observation mission found “‘deterioration in the democratic quality of Nicaraguan electoral
processes, due to the lack of transparency and neutrality with which they were administered by the 
Supreme Electoral Council’” (Booth et al. 124). This EU report reveals the corruption hidden within
the electoral system which influences other branches of government, affecting both the party system
and the consolidation of power in the executive under Ortega. President Ortega further consolidated 
his power with the 2014 constitutional amendment that eliminated “the two-term limit for the
president as well as the ban on consecutive reelection” and an additional provision that allowed 
government officials to remain in their positions after their terms had ended (Cherry 2014). Thus, 
according to Freedom House, Ortega has “consolidated all branches of government under his
party’s control,” marking his 2016 election as “severely flawed” with “post-election” violence
occurring in the 2017 municipal elections (“Freedom in the World: Nicaragua Profile”).
Similarly, the fraud and corruption problems that permeate the electoral branch also infect
the judicial branch. The judiciary finds itself under the control of the Ortega government and unable 
to effectively regulate the widespread corruption that ravishes Nicaragua and threatens democratic
stability. In Nicaragua’s 2018 country profile, Freedom House noted that “the judiciary remains 
dominated by the FSLN and PLC appointees [part of the Alemán-Ortega Pact], and the Supreme 
Court is a largely politicized body controlled by the Sandinista judges” (“Freedom in the World:
Nicaragua Profile”). According to a Community, Information, Empowerment, and Transparency 
(CIET) conducted poll, “40 percent of respondents pointed to corruption in the judicial branch; and
32 percent recognized that they paid bribes to court officials directly or through their lawyers”
(Krylova 40).  
Thus, instead of fighting the corruption that plagues Nicaraguan politics, the judicial branch
takes part as the judges capitalize on their positions. For example, when President Alemán was
finally charged for embezzling over a million dollars, the Supreme Court overturned his 20-year 
prison sentence in 2009 due to a deal between Ortega and Alemán where Alemán would win his 
freedom and Ortega would gain control of the National Assembly (Krylova 42). Ortega’s ability to
manipulate the Supreme Court and the ability of Alemán to avoid corruption punishment highlight 
the scale of corruption that infects Nicaragua. As Levitsky and Murillo suggest, “stable window-
dressing institutions are often accompanied by informal rules that help to guide actors’ expectations
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in context of limited enforcement” (102). Thus, individuals recognize
the fragility of the judicial system and the underlying rules—those that Ortega creates that 
function beneath the appearance of an independent judiciary.
Similar to the judiciary’s inability to convict corrupt politicians or resist the political pressures
of the ruling government, the forces responsible for enforcing anti-corruption law face their own
corruption. Although Nicaraguans respected the honesty of the Sandinista police of the 1980s, by
2009, “49 percent of Nicaraguans pointed to corruption in the national police; and 9 percent of 
respondents recognized that they paid bribes to police officers for their services” (Vanden and
Prevost 592, Krylova 40). With a police force where “bribery and corruption have developed on a 
widespread basis in the context of the desperate economic situation and low police salaries,”
institutional legitimacy falls, and citizens lose trust in democratic government (Vanden and Prevost
592). Thus, this “uneven rule of law has long enabled powerful actors to violate or ignore certain
rules with impunity” (Levitsky and Murillo 101). The laws lack legitimacy without a police force to 
enforce them and the anti-corruption reform instituted was largely ineffective.  
The anti-corruption agencies such as the Office of Citizen Complaints and the Office of Public
Ethics lacked the independence to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations effectively
(Krylova 42-43). The frequent corruption scandals such as the Chamorro and Alemán government
stealing $4.9 billion (ten times the state budget) and constant deal-making characterized the “rules 
of political competition and lawmaking more than courts and constitution” do (Vanden and
Prevost). Additionally, with “the justice system and other public bodies… subservient to Ortega and 
the FSLN” and Ortega appointing his son, daughter, and wife to ambassador, presidential advisor,
and vice president respectively, according to Coralie Pring, 52 percent of Nicaraguans believe that 
corruption increased in 2017 (Pring 10)
According to Krylova, “the escalation in corrupt activities were magnified historically by
processes of economic and political reform financed by IFS [international financial institutions] after
1990, particularly liberalization and privatization processes which shaped the political economy into 
clan-based patronage system” (Krylova 41). Therefore, corruption and the economy become closely
linked as one influences the other, and the “weak political and market institutions allow a variety of
illicit practices to flourish” (Johnston 4). Specifically, in 1990, already economically devastated by 
the Contra War, President Chamorro introduced neoliberal policies that “exacerbated the misery of
the ordinary Nicaraguans” with high unemployment, underemployment, and homelessness (Booth 
et al. 114). Although economic growth increased by 1995, the remaining unemployment and poverty
indicated that “the effects of neoliberal policies on the masses were far less positive than promised
and often imposed increased hardships” (Vanden and Prevost 586).
Under Ortega, however, the Nicaraguan economy has grown more than twice the Latin 
American average with his “highly favourable... tax policy [that indicates] an increasingly friendly 
relationship between business sectors and the Ortega government” (BBC 2016, Vanden and Prevost
590). This economic stability as well as his “expansion of social programs aiming to reduce poverty”
has contributed to his consolidation of power (BTI 2016). Despite corruption allegations that have
marred the majority of Nicaraguan administrations, according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung's 
Transformation Index (BTI) 2016 report, “the legitimacy of democracy seems to have 
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increased gradually since 1990” (BTI 2016). Significantly, however, while the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2012 found that 73.8 percent of Nicaraguans support democracy, they also
found that “the perception of the economic performance and political support, mainly for the FSLN
and Ortega’s government” influenced how individuals felt about democracy (BTI 2016). Nevertheless, 
according to Pew Research Center, in 2011, only 10.8 percent of the Nicaraguan population was middle
class—a 3 point increase from 2001 (Pew Research Center 2015). Thus, many Nicaraguans still live in
poverty despite Ortega’s reforms. According to M & R Consultore, in 2014, 73.4 percent of Nicaraguans 
felt that the Ortega government unites the country, and 73.3 percent are pleased with Ortega’s
presidency (Rico 2014). Therefore, Ortega gains the majority of his support not from the small and 
weak middle class but from a wider socioeconomic population. 
The Nicaraguan contentment with the economy must then stem from the economic growth and the
social programs that President Ortega has introduced. For example, he launched a Zero Hunger 
program that reduced the malnourishment of Nicaraguans by half in just six years (Vanden and
Prevost 588). Additionally, in 2009, the United Nations declared Nicaragua free of illiteracy with an
adult literacy rate of 78 percent in 2012, and 88.8 percent and 85.2 percent among females and males 
aged 15-24 respectively (Vanden and Prevost 588, UNICEF 2013). Despite the improving literacy rates,
“state education is known to have low quality,” with only 4.2 percent of the GDP spent on funding
education, and the mean number of years spent in schools at 5.8 (BTI 2016). Furthermore, “education
is badly distributed,” which exacerbates the inequality that plagues that country and leaves it with a 
low Human Development Index, (ranked 132 out of 187 countries), though “academic freedoms are
generally respected” and not deeply politicized (BTI 2016, “Freedom in the World: Nicaragua Profile”).
While the reform initiative of plebiscitarian presidents yield positive economic results, there is 
substantial risk of a slide into a kind of “soft authoritarianism” in which economic success is used by
the ruler to chip away at constitutional limits on his power” (Haggard and Kaufman 13).
The Future of Nicaraguan Democracy: The Risk of Backsliding 
During his presidency, Ortega has embodied this strategy of undermining constitutional limits
on power, and this flirtation with authoritarianism has endangered Nicaraguan civil rights. Diamond’s 
asserts that “executive abuse of power” from “weak constraints on executives by constitution,
parliament, [and] civil society” manifests in the civil rights abuses that injure Nicaraguan democracy
(Diamond 2017). Particularly, the Ortega administration has engaged “in systematic efforts to obstruct
and discredit media critics,” with journalists receiving death threats for covering political protests
(“Freedom in the World: Nicaragua Profile”) . This “erosion… of mass media” and freedom of
assembly threatens democratic stability in Nicaragua as control over the media allows Ortega to restrict 
his opposition and thus consolidate his power (Diamond 2017). Similar to the censoring of Nicaraguan 
media outlets, the “weakness of the judiciary impedes the state’s ability to respond to violations” of
civil freedoms and human rights formally protected by the constitution (BTI 2016). Nicaragua’s abuses
towards the indigenous populations and the LGBT community, as well as an increase in violence
against women, do not adhere to Diamond’s definition of liberal democracy: “minority rights [in] 
freedom, equality, and civic culture” (“Freedom in the World: Nicaragua Profile”). 
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Ultimately, the decline in rights, as well as the consolidation of power in the executive, suggests
a potential backsliding towards authoritarianism. From the weakening of the party system to the 
manipulation of the electoral system to serve personal interests, Nicaraguan democracy seems to be in
danger, though the people continue to support democracy and the Ortega administration. The ability 
of Daniel Ortega to alter and ignore aspects of the constitutional democracy reveals the weaknesses
that plague the system and emphasizes the institutional fragility that cannot withstand the corruption 
ravishing Nicaragua. Essentially, Ortega’s consolidation of power threatens the stability of Nicaraguan 
democracy and shows its illiberal tendencies that may lead to authoritarianism. 
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The Violence of Hate-Bias 
Crimes in Transition 
Dr. Jack McDevit is the Director of the 
Institute on Race and Justice at 
Northeastern University. Dr. Jack Levin 
is the Director of the Brudnick Center on 
Violence and Conflict, also at 
Northeastern University. Among their 
many publications in Criminology, they 
are co-authors of Hate Crimes: The Rising 
Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed as well as 
Hate Crimes Revisited. Their presentation 
at Stonehill’s Confronting the Violence of 
Hate-Bias Crimes in Transition discusses 
various aspects of hate-bias crimes. Their 
presentation included a description of 
the typology of hate-bias crimes and 
changes in hate-bias crimes over the past
decades. Dr. Devit and Dr. Levin also 
propose several effective pathways for 
preventing and responding to these 
crimes.
   By: Meaghan Gemma, Molly Parent & Riley Bast
“Don’t forget where the problem starts: in the 
silence of ordinary people” 
~Dr. Levin
On Monday, February 25th the Joseph W. Martin
Institute for Law & Society presented: Confronting 
The Violence of Hate-Bias Crimes in Transition. At
this event, Stonehill welcomed Dr. Jack McDevit and 
Dr. Jack Levin to their campus. The Martin
Auditorium was filled with students, faculty and other
members of the Stonehill community who anxiously
awaited to hear the two men’s expertise on hate 
crimes. Dr. McDevit and Dr. Levin began the event 
by sharing an objective description and understanding
of hate crimes. The two doctors then transitioned by
applying this knowledge to today and explaining its
relevance in our society. The event concluded with
Dr. McDevit and Dr. Levin’s advice to our
community and potential actions the audience can 
take to combat the prevalence of hate crimes.
Dr. McDevit began the event with a definition
of a bias crime, “a criminal incident motivated 
entirely or in part by a person’s difference”. This 
difference is not limited to one’s physical attributes
as a difference could be categorized as sexuality, 
religion or socio-economic status. Therefore, Dr. 
McDevit states that we are vulnerable to these bias
crimes though the victimization process differs by the 
difference being targeted. The prevalence of these 
crimes have fluctuated over time. In today’s society,
the increasing presence of firearms has caused us to
see a higher rate of bias crimes in our country. Dr. 
Levin reiterated the idea that factors which are unique 
to our country have influenced the presence of bias 
crimes. Dr. Levin posed that the well-known saying
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“make America great again” which once started as benign has been made hateful by people in society. Offenders
of these bias crimes have employed this message to justify their acts of hate toward various populations.
Dr. Levin and Dr. McDevit then shared their proposed typology of bias crime offenders: thrill, defensive,
retaliatory and mission. Dr. McDevit explained that thrill offenders commit these crimes for their own personal
enjoyment. Often, these offenders are younger and offend with a group. According to Dr. McDevit, this group
of offenders are the easiest to deter. Due to their young age and how their acts are typically done out of
convenience, they are not as committed to completing the act. In contrast to thrill, the defensive offender
commits bias crimes because they believe that the targeted group is a threat to their identity. Dr. McDevit states 
these crimes are largely based on geographic area, these offenders act out when they feel that a different
population is “infiltrating” an area that is mainly populated with their identity group. Defensive offenders are
similar to another subset of offenders: retaliatory. Retaliatory offenders commit bias crimes against populations
who they associate with a triggering event. This event is considered a perceived harm by the offender and their
crime is done out revenge for this harm. Finally, mission offenders are the most severe offender. This typology
is committed to a hate group and therefore committed to a life of evil. Though the number of this type of
offenders is small, Dr. McDevit asserts that they are dangerous in the fact that they recruit other members into
their ideology and persuade to commit bias crimes for it. The prevalence and acts of these four types of offenders
have changed with the surrounding society.
Bias crimes dating back to the 1990s were reported as less organized and not recognized in the ways that they
are today. Rates of bias crimes in America skyrocketed after the terrorist incident on 9/11. This incident sparked
a level of hate and fear towards certain populations. As a result, the rates of retaliatory and defensive offenders
rose significantly. These bias crimes targeted anyone who was perceived as foreign or an outsider to the United 
States. For example, the number of attacks against Muslims and Arabs increased by 1600% in the time 
following 9/11. Dr. Levin stated that this introduced a theme of utilizing violence as a defense mechanism, 
where individuals place blame on certain populations for issues and events outside of their control. This has
only increased with the use of mainstream media as this message can now be shared on platforms with large 
audiences. “Online, they [individuals with biased ideologies] find propaganda yes, but they also find company,
and it is plenty of company in their hatred that spurs them on.”
These targeted populations vary by the event in question. As demonstrated through the election of Barack
Obama and the subsequent violent attacks on African Americans such as the burning of an African-American 
church in Springfield, MA. This is consistent with the high rate of bias crimes against the LGBTQ+ community
after the nationwide legalization of same sex marriage in 2015. As the prevalence of bias crimes continues to
grow in the United States, Dr. McDevit and Dr. Levin offer a number of effective societal responses.
The response to bias crimes is not a simply one, as both doctors expressed, “there is not one step but many”.
The proposed solutions began with the emphasis that members of society need to take hateful acts seriously. 
This includes responding to all hate crimes regardless of how minor they may seem. Dr. Levin suggests that 
hateful acts often start small such as the use of slurs or derogatory terms. These acts commonly go unnoticed 
as they are perceived as minor and nonviolent. However, any act of hate needs to be considered harmful and
requiring preventative action. On the other hand, the doctors stressed the need to reward positive behavior.
These behavior is categorized as any that combats hatred as well as supports diversity and inclusivity. In terms 
of addressing past grievances against certain populations, it is necessary to acknowledge the wrongs committed 
by the country and become familiar with the history of bias and hatred. Dr. Levin and Dr. McDevit concluded
with challenging society. They asserted that we must change our thinking, we must become more 
interdependent and find areas of commonality so that we may succeed together.
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Interview with Professor Erica Tucker
By: Meaghan Gemma & Riley Bast 
Erica Tucker is a Professor of
Anthropology at Stonehill 
College. Professor Tucker started
on the path of anthropology at
Beloit College in Wisconsin.
There, Tucker enrolled in many 
Anthropology courses and 
earned a bachelor’s degree in the
field. Upon completing her 
undergraduate schooling, Tucker 
moved to Poland where she 
taught English to Polish students. 
After living in Poland for a year,
Professor Tucker returned to
Wisconsin to attend graduate
school at University of Wisconsin 
where she continued her
anthropology studies. Professor 
Tucker taught as a Professor of
anthropology at Butler University 
before joining the Stonehill 
community.
What is anthropology?
Anthropology is the study of human culture, both the past and 
the present. Anthropology has four major focuses: cultural 
anthropology, linguistic anthropology, archeological 
anthropology and  biological anthropology. Here at Stonehill, 
the anthropology major is focused on cultural anthropology 
with some linguistic and archeology anthropology.
How did you get involved in the field of anthropology?
My mother was the first to suggest I enroll in an introduction to 
anthropology course. At the time, I was a student at Beloit college
and I was trying to decide what I was going to study. My mother
worked as a foreign language teacher and she knew how much I 
enjoyed learning about different languages. I enjoy learning about 
these languages because it gives me a window another world and
culture. I think my mother knew that about me and for that reason
she pushed me to anthropology and so I decided to take her 
advice. From there, I found the anthropology courses very
enjoyable and I became very interested in learning about other
cultures. I found the class materials to be very intriguing. I 
especially loved to read the ethnographies, I found they were
really interesting and very easy to read.
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Are there any anthropologists that you would say have influenced your thinking? 
Barbara Myeroff and her studies strongly influenced my future work and research topics. Though
Myeroff conducted studies focused on Native Americans in New Mexico, her work with immigrant
Jewish family was most influential to me. This study focused on memory within older members of
Myeroff’s sample family. I found this very intriguing and it inspired me to study memory in my future 
work as well as helped me find an interest in working with older populations. Specifically, Myeroff
influenced one of my first anthropology studies in Warsaw. In this study, I looked at how older 
members living in a Warsaw neighborhood and their memories of the German occupation. My 
experience studying abroad in Poland my junior year at Beloit also influenced my future work in the
field and is what inspired me to conduct this study in Poland.
What would you say are your research interests?
I have had a variety of research interests throughout my career. My research study in Warsaw focused
largely on memory. At the time of my study, Poland just gained freedom of the press which sparked 
my interest. I was interested in how one’s ability to talk about an event impacts their remembrance of
said event. In other words, “what happens to a memory when you cannot publically acknowledge it?”.
I conducted a second study in Warsaw pertaining to a museum which commemorated the uprising of
1994. I was interested in how the museum represented history to the public. What really interested me
about this museum was how popular it was among the people of Poland. I was curious to why the
museum was so popular, it was very intriguing to me. My research looked at the museum and how it
popularized history as well as how it created an identity for the people of Poland. This inspired me to
study how history is portrayed in the United States through a study on how history is portrayed in
children’s books. My most recent research interest is the new, modern interest in genealogy. More
specifically, I am interested in what people do with the information about their family lineage and how 
it changes their sense of self. This is something I am going to look into on my sabbatical next spring. 
Do you have any publications you are particularly proud of? 
My most recent publication is a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research studies. In
this chapter I explain how to study museums. I have also published a book titled, Remembering 
Occupied Warsaw, which is a collection of memories of Polish peoples who lived in Poland through 
World War II.  
Anthropology has recently been added as a major here at Stonehill. Could you discuss what the
major will consist of? 
Students within the major will be required to take 10 courses. The required courses include
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, Qualitative Research Methods, History of Anthropological 
Theory and their Capstone, which will most likely be a directed study. In addition, students will be
required to take two elective courses where they will be able to explore other disciplines that pertain 
to anthropology. Anthropology majors will also take two courses pertaining to specific regions and 
two classes that focus on a subfield of anthropology.  
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What classes do you teach here at Stonehill?
I teach Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, Language and Culture, Families and Cultural 
Perspective, Qualitative Research Methods and occasionally I will teach a course on the Holocaust and 
East Europe. 
What is your favorite course to teach and why?
My favorite courses to teach are Introduction to Anthropology and Language and Culture. I enjoy
teaching Introduction to Anthropology because the material is so familiar to me that the course allows
me to really focus on the students and their responses to the material. I enjoy teaching and Culture
because I find the topic so interesting. I really enjoy discussing with my students how we, as a society,
interpret language. Everyone has ideas about proper and improper language and it is fun to explore
that with my students in class. 
What do you like most about teaching at Stonehill?
I really like the small class size at Stonehill. The class size allows me to get to know my students and 
form relationships with them. A small class also brings a certain kind of energy to the class which
makes it enjoyable to teach. 
What advice do you have for students going into the field of anthropology? 
I would advise students interested in anthropology study abroad in a place of interest to you. Further,
I think it is a good idea to learn a foreign language and study in a place where you have the opportunity 
to practice those skills. For students graduating in the field, I would advise focusing on a graduate
school that is a good match for you and your research interests. Be sure that the schools you are
applying to have the resources and opportunities for you to further your research interests. 
Do you have any fun facts?
I really enjoy plants, I have them all around my office here at Stonehill. Sometimes I even give my
plants away to my students. I also enjoy knitting and I recently taught Sociology Professor Gill how to
knit. I also knit clothing for professors in the department who have had children recently including
Professor Buckman and Professor Carkin Lacorazza. 
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